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3.1  Introduction 
There is wide agreement that large government budget deficits are undesir- 
able. The main argument is that a deficit forces the government to borrow, 
raising interest rates and crowding out private-sector investment. Furthermore, 
accumulated government debt constitutes a potentially unfair burden on future 
generations and reduces a country’s credit rating on international markets. 
Despite these obvious drawbacks, most governments run substantial deficits. 
Deficit spending may be partly driven by  a desire to smooth the distortion of 
taxes needed to finance government consumption over time (Barro 1979) but, 
as stressed by Velasco (chap. 2 in this volume), the magnitude of budget defi- 
cits since the early seventies has been too large to be explained by  such inter- 
temporal tax smoothing. Recently, a literature has developed seeking to explain 
the formation of government deficits as a consequence of a coordination failure 
among spending ministers or political parties (in the “tragedy of the commons” 
sense), or as a consequence of excessively short planning horizons of govern- 
ments who do not expect to remain in office (e.g., Hallerberg and von Hagen, 
chap. 9 in this volume; Velasco, chap. 2 in this volume). In either case, the 
government does not internalize the full social cost of deficit spending, which 
Adriana Arreaza is a Ph.D. student in the Economics Department at Brown University. Bent E. 
Sorensen is assistant professor of economics at Brown University. Oved Yosha is senior lecturer 
at the Berglas School of  Economics, Tel Aviv University. 
The authors thank Charles Goodhart for encouraging them to investigate risk-sharing patterns 
in Europe and Alex Cukierman, Manfred Neumann, Assaf Razin, and conference participants for 
helpful comments. Soreensen  acknowledges financial support from the Watson Institute, Brown 
University, and thanks Tel Aviv University for its hospitality. The authors gratefully acknowledge 
financial support through a Salomon Grant from Brown University, a grant from the Armand Ham- 
mer Fund for Economic Cooperation in the Middle East, and a United States National Science 
Foundation grant. Hyung-Kwon Chung, Sara Dawes, and Lisa Wu provided excellent research 
assistance at various stages of the project. 
59 60  Adriana Arreaza, Bent E. Sorensen, and Oved Yosha 
results in deficits that are larger than what is socially optimal.’ In other words, 
large deficits may be a consequence of “fiscal sinning,” reflecting deficiencies 
in the political decision-making process rather than long-run optimal planning. 
In some countries, there are legal restrictions on the size of the deficit for vari- 
ous levels of government. The effectiveness of such restrictions has been stud- 
ied by, for example, Poterba (1994), Bohn and Inman (1996), and Poterba and 
Rueben (chap. 8 in this volume). 
Government deficits may serve to reduce the variability of consumption over 
time if, for example, the government has better access to foreign credit markets 
than the private sector. Among the authors who have focused on the cyclical 
properties of  government deficits, Gavin and Perotti (1997) have pointed out 
that deficits have been countercyclical in OECD countries, contributing to the 
stabilization of consumption over the business cycle,2  whereas in Latin Amer- 
ica government deficits have been procyclical  (see also Gavin et al.  1996). 
SQrensen and Yosha (1998) have recently found that government budget defi- 
cits play a central role in smoothing consumption among OECD and EU coun- 
tries. They report, for the period  1966-90,  that there is virtually  no cross- 
country income smoothing (income insurance) among OECD countries, and 
that  the  only  operative  mechanism  for smoothing  gross  domestic  product 
(GDP) shocks is through borrowing and lending. They estimate that about 40 
percent of shocks to GDP are smoothed on average at the one-year frequency 
through this channel, with about half the smoothing achieved through govern- 
ment budget deficits and half through corporate saving (dividend smoothing). 
At the three-year frequency all the smoothing is achieved through government 
budget deficits, with only 25 percent of shocks to GDP absorbed. 
To obtain a more complete picture of government consumption smoothing 
mechanisms, we measure the amount of smoothing achieved through various 
components of the deficit. For EU countries, we find that, at the one-year fre- 
quency, about 13 percent of shocks to GDP are smoothed on average via gov- 
ernment consumption,  18 percent of  shocks are smoothed  via government 
transfers, and about 5 percent are smoothed via government subsidies, while 
taxes do not smooth consumption. The results for OECD countries are very 
similar3  Taxes actually dis-smooth consumption, that is, they increase less than 
proportionately with output, which may be due to institutional rigidities in the 
tax system or to increased tax evasion during booms. If excessive deficits are 
a result of political expedience, with deficits increasing sharply in recessions 
1. The “tragedy of the commons” is a classic example of  such an outcome. When economic 
agents possess a common resource-the  grass in the commons, or a marine fishery as in Levhari 
and Mirman 1980-they  tend to deplete the resource too quickly. 
2. Evidence regarding the countercyclicality of U.S. federal debt since the 1920s is provided by 
Barro (1979). 
3. These findings are consistent with results reported by  Gavin and Perotti (1997). The main 
advantage of  our method for studying this issue is that it allows us to estimate the fraction of 
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but not rapidly reversed in booms, then the government deficit will absorb a 
larger fraction of  negative shocks than of positive  shocks. We examine this 
issue, finding that government consumption smooths positive and negative out- 
put shocks equally. Government transfers provide more smoothing of negative 
shocks among EU countries but not among OECD countries, which probably 
reflects a higher commitment to social insurance in EU countries. 
Next, we investigate the relation between the level of the government deficit 
and the amount of consumption smoothing achieved through (government and 
private) saving. The level of the deficit may affect the ability of the government 
to use the deficit as a tool for smoothing consumption. For example, govern- 
ments that during recessions provide many public services and distribute trans- 
fers generously,  but tax moderately,  may  find it hard to reverse  this pattern 
in booms due to institutional rigidities or political pressure. It is, therefore, 
conceivable that high deficits are associated with little, not much, government 
consumption smoothing. The level of the government deficit may also affect 
the ability of the private sector to smooth consumption since government bor- 
rowing may crowd out private-sector borrowers who face high interest rates or 
credit constraints. To investigate these issues empirically, we split our sample 
into high- and low-deficit countries, finding no evidence in support of  such 
effects. There seems to be no trade-off between high government deficits in a 
country and the ability to smooth consumption via saving in that country. 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (chap. 9 in this volume) find that fiscal institu- 
tions have a significant impact on the level of the public sector deficit. We ask 
whether the  amount of  smoothing via deficits  differs according to the type 
of budgetary  institution that determines  government  fiscal policy, using  the 
classification of Hallerberg and von Hagen, to whom we are grateful for kindly 
providing us the data. We find that in countries where there is “delegation” of 
power (e.g., to a strong finance minister) or where fiscal targets are negotiated 
effectively  by  coalition  members,  consumption  smoothing  via  government 
consumption  and  government  transfers  is  considerably  higher  (although 
smoothing via government subsidies is smaller). This result is not driven by 
the effect of budgetary institutions on the level of the deficit since there is no 
apparent statistical relation between the level of the deficit and the amount of 
consumption smoothing in a country. We interpret this finding as evidence that 
effective budgetary institutions can accomplish efficient consumption smooth- 
ing via government deficit spending and lower average deficits. 
Our findings have implications for the evaluation of the Maastricht guide- 
lines requiring countries wishing to  join the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
to reduce the yearly deficit to less than 3 percent of GDP and national debt to 
less than 60 percent of GDP. Sorensen and Yosha (1998) suggested that since 
much of the smoothing among EU countries is achieved via government lend- 
ing and borrowing (with all the smoothing achieved  via this channel at the 
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least until capital markets are sufficiently integrated to carry out this role, as 
they do in the United States (see Asdrubali,  Sorensen, and Yosha 1996). In 
light of the evidence suggesting that a large deficit is not necessary for better 
consumption smoothing in a country (including consumption smoothing via 
the deficit itself), we must qualify our criticism of the Maastricht guidelines 
by stressing that average deficits must be kept low, but that governments should 
be allowed, temporarily, to run high deficits during recessions. 
We realize that the enforcement of such guidelines is tricky, for example, 
due to potential time inconsistency in the policy of the European Commission 
with regard to governments that run persistent  deficit^,^ and since capital and 
credit markets may not generate effective sanctions to ensure fiscal discipline. 
We nevertheless believe that it is important to have a clear view regarding the 
“ideal” fiscal policy that combines the benefits from long-run fiscal discipline 
with the benefits from government consumption smoothing in an incomplete 
markets en~ironment.~ 
In the next section we briefly describe the channels through which income 
and consumption smoothing occur among regions or countries, and describe 
the  methodology  for measuring  the  fraction  of  shocks to  GDP smoothed 
through each channel. In section 3.3 we update the main regression of Sor- 
ensen and Yosha (1998) to the sample used here, and then present our results 
regarding patterns of smoothing through fiscal policy. Section 3.4 concludes. 
3.2  Income and Consumption Smoothing 
among OECD and EU Countries 
We begin by reviewing the channels through which regions and countries 
smooth output shocks. Government fiscal policy is but one such channel. It is 
not obvious that governments should use fiscal policy to smooth  shocks to 
GDP since, in principle, consumption can be smoothed through transactions 
by individuals and corporations on markets. It can be argued, though, that if 
markets fail to provide income and consumption smoothing, governments can 
step in, borrowing and lending internationally on behalf of the country’s citi- 
zens to help smooth national consumption. This, however, may slow down the 
development of financial markets. In light of these considerations we believe 
that it is useful to perform the analysis of the consumption-smoothing role of 
government fiscal policy in a more general framework where other forms of 
income and consumption smoothing are analyzed. We therefore begin by pre- 
senting such a framework, developed in Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha 1996. 
4.  For example, due to the political cost or the ex post nonoptimality of imposing sanctions on 
5. For further discussion of EMU-related fiscal issues, see Goodhart and Smith 1993, Inman 
countries in recession. 
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3.2.1  Channels of Income and Consumption Smoothing among Countries 
There  are  several  mechanisms for  smoothing income  and  consumption 
among regions or countries. Individuals in one country can hold claims to out- 
put produced in other countries. For example, if  institutional investors (e.g., 
pension funds) in a country invest internationally, income in that country will 
comove with the output in other countries. Similarly, if financial intermediaries 
in one country lend to borrowers in other countries, the flow of interest pay- 
ments smooths income in the lending country. We refer to this mechanism as 
income smoothing (or risk sharing) through cross-border ownership of produc- 
tive assets. It consists mainly of cross-country income smoothing via capital 
income flows, but, more generally, it also includes labor income flows. 
Similarly, international transfers smooth income if  the net transfers to a 
country are larger during (country-specific) recessions. Of course, the motiva- 
tion for having an international tax-transfer system need not be related to in- 
come smoothing, but a tax-transfer system designed to redistribute income 
across countries or to finance multinational projects may contribute to interna- 
tional income smoothing. The empirical implication of  income smoothing, 
whether through capital markets or via international transfers, is that cross- 
country income variability will be lower than cross-country output variability. 
Intertemporal consumption smoothing-through  saving and dis-saving- 
also contributes to intercountry consumption smoothing. Individuals in one 
country can increase or decrease their saving in response to income shocks, 
adjusting the amount of domestic investment or transferring funds across coun- 
try borders with the help of  financial intermediaries. Similarly, corporations 
can retain more or less profits in response to profitability shocks. The retained 
profits can be invested in physical assets in the country where the corporation 
operates, or in financial assets; the funds may then finance investment in the 
home country or in other countries. In any event, the empirical implication is 
that cross-country consumption variability will be lower than cross-country 
income variability. 
Intertemporal consumption smoothing through government saving and dis- 
saving has precisely the same effect. During recessions the government runs a 
large deficit, borrowing internationally, and during booms it runs a surplus (or 
a smaller deficit), reducing its stock of debt (or the growth rate of its debt).6 
The government can run a countercyclical deficit by adopting a countercyclical 
expenditure policy, a countercyclical transfers and subsidies policy, or a procy- 
clical tax policy. These forms of government consumption smoothing have the 
same empirical consequence, namely, to reduce cross-country consumption 
variability. 
Cross-country income smoothing via factor income flows is reflected in the 
6.  In practice, the government may borrow domestically, crowding out private-sector borrowers 
who are forced to raise money internationally. The final result is the same. 64  Adriana Arreaza, Bent E. S~rensen,  and Oved Yosha 
National Accounts  data as the difference between  GDP and gross national 
product  (GNP). The difference between the GNP and GDP of  a country is 
precisely the net flow of capital and labor income to that country (see Atkeson 
and Bayoumi 1993). Net international transfers are measured as the difference 
between Disposable National Income (DNI) and National Income (NI).’  Con- 
sumption smoothing is manifested in the National Accounts as the difference 
between  disposable  income, DNI, and total  (private and  government) con- 
sumption, C + G. 
Patterns of capital depreciation may also contribute to cross-country income 
smoothing. In the National Accounts, depreciation is responsible for the dis- 
crepancy between  GNP and NI. As depreciation  is calculated according to 
fixed accounting rules, and since the capital-output ratio is typically countercy- 
clical, depreciation in the National Accounts data will constitute a larger frac- 
tion of output in recessions and a smaller fraction in booms, resulting in higher 
cross-sectional variance of NI with respect to GNP (dis-smoothing).8 
3.2.2  Measuring the Fraction of Shocks 
Smoothed through Various Channels 
We begin with a benchmark-perfect  consumption smoothing and full risk 
sharing. Risk is fully shared within a group of countries if the consumption of 
a country cornoves with the aggregate consumption of the group, but does not 
comove with country-specific  shock^.^ Denote the period t total (private and 
public) per capita consumption of the representative consumer of country i by 
C:  + GI,  and the period  t per capita aggregate GDP of the entire group of 
countries by GDP,. Then, when individuals have the same constant elasticity 
utility functions and are equally impatient across countries, full risk sharing 
implies that 
(1)  C +  G:  =  L‘GDP,, 
where kl is a country-specific (time and state of the world invariant) constant 
representing the strength of country i’s claim to output in the risk-sharing ar- 
7. The National Accounting concepts we use are those of the OECD National Accounts publica- 
tions. These concepts differ slightly from those in the United States Statistical Abstract. For ex- 
ample, the Abstract defines Net National Income as Net National Product minus indirect taxes 
plus subsidies, whereas in the OECD National Accounts publications Gross National Income is 
obtained from Gross National Product by  adding and subtracting only  intenutiunul taxes and 
transfers. 
8. Real capital depreciation may be affected by economic activity. For example, there may be 
more capital depreciation during booms due to more intense utilization of productive capacity. 
Such effects are not likely to be reflected in the National Accounts data. 
9. See, e.g., Cochrane 1991, Mace 1991, Obstfeld 1994, and Townsend 1994. For extensions of 
the basic framework, see, eg,  Canova and Ravn  1996 and Lewis 1996. A comprehensive survey 
of research on international diversification is provided in Lewis  1995 and Obstfeld and Rogoff 
1996. Recent related contributions can be found in Leiderman and Razin 1994. For microstudies 
of risk sharing, see, e.g., Altug and Miller 1990 and Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff 1996. For an 
estimation of welfare gains from risk sharing, see, e.g., van Wincoop  1994 and Tesar 1995 for 
OECD countries, and Sdrensen and Yosha 1996 for US.  states. 65  Consumption Smoothing through Fiscal Policy 
rangement.  In  other words, when risk is fully shared, consumption in each 
country is a country-specific fixed proportion of aggregate output.'O 
The derivation of equation (1) can be found in most of the references in note 
9 and is, therefore, omitted. It should be stressed, though, that expected utility 
maximization by the representative consumer in each country is part of this 
derivation, and for equation (1) to hold it is necessary that, for each country, 
the marginal utility of consumption in period t be equal to the expected mar- 
ginal utility in period t + l.  Full risk sharing thus implies perfect consumption 
smoothing for each country, in the standard Euler equation sense. 
Returning  to our discussion of the channels of income and consumption 
smoothing among countries,  we think of  consumers in each country prog- 
ressing gradually from their endowment (no intertemporal smoothing nor in- 
tercountry  risk  sharing) toward  full risk  sharing  and  perfect  consumption 
smoothing, that is, toward the allocation in equation (l), which may or may 
not be eventually achieved. The first level of smoothing is income smoothing 
(income insurance) through international factor income flows. In theory, full 
risk sharing may be achieved already at this level of smoothing, in which case 
GNP = PGDP, with no further need for income or consumption smoothing. 
If full risk sharing is not achieved at this level, there is scope for further income 
smoothing through international transfers. If full risk sharing is not achieved 
after the second level of  income smoothing, there is scope for consumption 
smoothing, that is, borrowing and lending by individuals, corporations, or the 
government.  Then, after all channels of income and consumption smoothing 
have been exhausted, equation (1) may or may not hold. Even if equation (1) 
does not hold, it is still of  interest to estimate the incremental  amount of 
smoothing that is achieved through the various channels. We now describe how 
the estimation is carried out. 
Consider the identity 
where all the magnitudes are in per capita terms, and i is an index of countries. 
The national accounting identities that are relevant here are GNP = GDP + net 
factor income, NI = GNP -  capital depreciation, DNI = NI + international 
transfers, C + G = NI -  net saving. 
If  there  is smoothing through  net  factor income flows, namely, income 
smoothing via cross-country ownership of productive assets, then GDP/GNP 
10. This formulation assumes that private and public consumption are perfect substitutes. It is 
also assumed that GDP shocks are exogenous, which is a reasonable assumption at relatively short 
time horizons. At longer horizons, income and consumption smoothing patterns may affect the 
cross-country correlation of GDP shocks, as argued by Frankel and Rose (1998). 
11. It may not be optimal for consumers to fully smooth shocks to income (i.e., output shocks 
that were not insured) if these shocks are highly persistent. Lack of consumption smoothing there- 
fore need not imply any imperfections of  credit markets. 66  Adriana Arreaza, Bent E. S~rensen,  and Oved Yosha 
should vary positively with GDP. Similarly, if  depreciation of capital further 
smooths income, then GNPN  should vary positively with GDP. If net trans- 
fers from abroad, for example, transfers from EU institutions, contribute to 
income smoothing, then NI’DNI’ should vary positively with GDP. If  saving 
further smooths total consumption, then DNI’/(C + G)  should vary positively 
with GDP. Finally, to the extent that not all the shocks to GDP are smoothed, 
C‘  + G will be positively correlated with GDP.12 
The cross-sectional smoothing of income shocks may involve cross-border 
flows of funds as in the case of factor income flows and international transfers, 
or it may not, as in the case of  domestic investment or capital depreciation. 
Accounting capital depreciation of a country’s capital stock is not sensitive to 
GDP fluctuations since it is approximately a predetermined proportion of the 
capital stock that itself does not vary much with shocks to GDP. Therefore, the 
ratio of  accounting capital depreciation to GDP will typically decline when a 
country is hit by a positive shock and rise in response to a negative shock, with 
the result that capital depreciation typically contributes to cross-sectional dis- 
smoothing of shocks to output. 
To  obtain a measure of smoothing, we use the above identity 
that holds for any given year in the sample. To stress the cross-sectional nature 
of our derivation, we suppress the time index. Now take logs and time differ- 
ences, multiply both sides by Alog GDP (minus its mean), and take the cross- 
sectional average, obtaining the following variance decomposition:I3 
VW{A  log GDP’}  zz  COV{A  log GDP’,  A log GDP’ - A log GNP’] 
+  COV{A  log GDP’,  A log GNP’ - A log NI‘} 
+ COV{A  log GDP’,  A log NI’ - A log DNI‘] 
+  COV{A  log GDP‘,  A log DNI‘ - A lOg(C’ +  GI)} 
+  cov{A log GDP‘,  A log(C’ +  GI)}. 
Dividing by var(A1og GDP) we get 1 = pf + p,  + p, + p, + p,,,  where &is 
the ordinary least squares estimate of the slope in the cross-sectional  regression 
12. Due to the more limited availability of data for US.  states, Asdrubali, Sgirensen, and Yosha 
(1996) considered the following channels for smoothing shocks to gross state product: “capital 
market smoothing,” which is income smoothing through cross-state factor income flows, deprecia- 
tion, and corporate saving; “federal smoothing,” which is income smoothing through interstate 
taxes and transfers by  the US.  federal government; and “credit market smoothing:’  which refers 
13. In this equatgn “var{Xy and “cov{X,Y}”  denote the statistics 1/N Cz,(X -  x)’ and 1/N 
to consumption smoothing through personal and state government saving.  - 
Ck,(X -  X)(Y - 0,  respectively, where N is the number of countries in the sample. 67  Consumption Smoothing through Fiscal Policy 
of Alog GDP -  Alog GNP on Alog GDP', p,  is the slope in the cross-sectional 
regression of  Alog GNP -  Alog NI' on Alog GDP, and similarly for p,  and 
p,.  p,  is the coefficient in the cross-sectional regression of Alog(C + G)  on 
Alog GDP. We  interpret the  p coefficients as  the  incremental percentage 
amounts of  smoothing achieved at each level, and p,  as the percentage of 
shocks not smoothed. If  p,  = 0, there is full risk sharing and the remaining 
coefficients sum to 1. Otherwise, they sum to less than 1. We do not constrain 
any of the p coefficients, at any level, to be positive or less than 1. Therefore, 
if there is dis-smoothing at some level, it will be reflected in a negative value 
of p. 
At the practical level, the following (panel) equations are estimated: 
Alog GDP: - Alog GNP:  =  u~,,  +  pf  Alog GDP: +  E;,,, 
Alog GNP: - Alog NI:  =  u~,  +  p,  Alog GDP: +  ~f,,, 
A log NI: - A log DNI:  =  u~,,  +  p,  A log GDP: +  E:,~, 
A log DNI: - A log (C:  +  G:)  =  u,~  + p,  A log GDP: +  E:,,, 
(2) 
A log (C:  +  G:)  =  u,, + p,  A log GDP: +  E:,,  , 
where u  are time-fixed effects. The inclusion of time-fixed effects is crucial, 
since with time-fixed effects the p coefficients are weighted averages of the 
year-by-year cross-sectional regressions.14  The time-fixed effects capture year- 
specific impacts on growth rates, most notably the impact of  the growth in 
aggregate EU (or OECD) output. To take into account autocorrelation in the 
residuals we assume that the error terms in each equation and in each country 
follow an AR( 1) process. Since the samples are short, we assume that the auto- 
correlation parameter is identical across countries and equations. We  further 
allow for country-specific variances of the error terms. In practice, we estimate 
the system in equation (2) by a two-step generalized least squares (GLS) pro- 
cedure. Unless we  explicitly say otherwise, we  use differenced data at the 
yearly frequency. 
3.3  Consumption Smoothing through Fiscal Policy among 
OECD and EU  Countries: Empirical Results 
The data are from the OECD National Accounts, Detailed Tables (vol. 2), 
1996 diskettes. For the series we need, there are consistent data for the majority 
of countries for the period 1971-93. 
For the sake of consistency, and as a robustness check, we update here the 
relevant analysis in Serensen and Yosha 1998 using differenced data for 1971- 
14. See Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha 1996, note 5,  for an explicit formula. 68  Adriana Arreaza, Bent E. Serensen, and Oved Yosha 
Table 3.1  Channels of Income and Consumption Smoothing (percent) 
OECD17 
197  1-93  1980-93  197  1-93  1980-93 
EU8  EUI 1  OECD  14 
Factor income (pf)  -1  -3  -1  -1 
(1)  (2)  (1)  (1) 
Capital depreciation (p,)  -8  -8  -8  -9 
(1)  (1)  (1)  (1) 
International transfers (p,)  3  5  2  3 
(2)  (2)  (1)  (1) 
(5)  (5)  (3)  (4) 
(4)  (5)  (3)  (3) 
Saving (p,)  50  37  48  46 
Not smoothed (p,)  56  69  59  62 
Note: EU8: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, United Kingdom. 
EUll: EU8 + Italy, Netherlands, Sweden. OECD14: EU8 + Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, 
Switzerland, United States. OECDl7: OECD14 + Italy, Netherlands, Sweden. Fraction of shocks 
absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors in parentheses. pf  is the GLS estimate of the 
slope in the regression of A log GDP’ -  A log GNP’  on A log GDP’, p,  is the slope in the regres- 
sion of A log GNP‘ -  A log NI’ on A log GDP‘, and similarly for p,  and p,.  p,  is the coefficient in 
the regression of  A log (C‘ + G’)  on A log GDP’.  We interpret the p coefficients as the incremental 
percentage amounts of smoothing achieved at each level, and p,  as the percentage of  shocks not 
smoothed. 
93.  In  table  3.1  we  display  the  estimated  percentages of  shocks to  GDP 
smoothed through each channel, among OECD and EU countries. The results 
are very similar to those in Sarensen and Yosha 1998.15  It is immediately appar- 
ent that there is negligible  income smoothing through factor income flows, 
among EU as well as OECD countries. This finding is fully consistent with the 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) puzzle and with the “home bias” puzzle (French 
and Poterba 1991; Tesar and Werner 1995).16  There is also very little smooth- 
ing via international transfers, resulting in almost no income smoothing among 
OECD and EU countries. 
The  only  operative  smoothing  mechanism  is  consumption  smoothing 
through saving. For the period 1971-93 it amounts to 48 percent of shocks to 
CDP  for OECD countries and 50 percent of shocks for EU countries. Further- 
more, Sarensen and Yosha (1998) estimated the fraction of  shocks smoothed 
by  the main components of national saving, and found that personal  saving 
contributes nothing to cross-country consumption smoothing, corporate saving 
absorbs 23 percent of shocks to CDP at the one-year frequency but provides 
no smoothing at the three-year frequency, while government saving absorbs 
about 25-30  percent of  shocks at both frequencies. A plausible interpretation 
is that the longer differencing period captures the response of changes in in- 
15. The estimated coefficients do not sum to 100 percent because of  rounding. 
16. See Gordon and Bovenberg 1996 for a recent contribution on this issue. 69  Consumption Smoothing through Fiscal Policy 
come and consumption to longer-lasting shocks to GDP. Thus, in a bad year, 
corporations decrease (on average) the fraction of earnings they retain (to avoid 
a sharp decrease in distributed profits), but over longer horizons corporations 
do not change the fraction of earnings retained. By contrast, governments re- 
spond to temporary as well as to longer-lasting shocks by adjusting the budget 
deficit in response to fluctuations in GDP. 
As a further robustness check, we decompose Alog GDP into a predicted part 
and an unpredicted part. As predictors we use lagged Alog GDP and lagged 
Alog WORLD GDP (two lags of  each). We  then estimate equation (2) using 
the fitted value and the innovations as regressors (each separately, in place of 
Alog GDP), finding that the estimated coefficients are similar for the predicted 
and the unpredicted components of changes in GDP.  l7 
We turn to a more detailed analysis of the patterns of consumption smooth- 
ing via government fiscal policy, which is our focus in this paper. Due to data 
availability, the countries included vary somewhat across regressions. They are 
listed in the notes to the various tables. In all regressions for the OECD group 
we excluded Luxembourg and Mexico. 
3.3.1  Smoothing through Fiscal Components: 
Tax Smoothing or Consumption Smoothing? 
Table 3.2 displays the average size (across countries and across years) of the 
main components of the budget for the general government sector (central + 
local government). Most notable is the larger fraction of GDP allocated to gov- 
ernment transfers (mainly social security benefits and social assistance) in EU 
countries in comparison to the entire OECD group, although also taxes are 
higher on average among the EU countries.ls 
Table 3.3 displays averages across countries of  simple country-by-country 
time series correlations of  government budget components with GDP. These 
correlations do not control for aggregate (world) output fluctuations and ex- 
hibit high variation across countries, but are nevertheless suggestive. It is ap- 
parent that government transfers and subsidies are acyclical or countercyclical 
and, therefore, are likely to play a major role in cross-country consumption 
smoothing, particularly in EU countries, where government transfers on aver- 
age are larger relative to GDP. Furthermore, transfers and subsidies are sub- 
stantially more countercyclical in the later sample period, suggesting that the 
17. The amount of income smoothing via factor income flows of both types of shocks is not 
significantly different from zero, the amount of income smoothing via international transfers varies 
from 1 to 5 percent of  shocks and is precisely estimated, and the fraction of  shocks smoothed 
through saving varies from 29 to 46 percent, which is qualitatively similar to the results displayed 
in table 3.1. 
18. We stress that transfers and taxes in tables 3.2-3.7  refer to within-country (not intercountry) 
transfers, subsidies, and taxes. Intercountry net transfers vary roughly proportionately with GDP 
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Table 3.2  The Size of Fiscal Components (percentage of GDP) 
EU8  EUll  OECD14  OECDl8 
1971-93  1980-93  197  1-93  1980-93 
Government consumption  19 
(3) 
Government transfers  17 
(4) 
Government subsidies  3 
(1) 
Government indirect taxes  15 
(2) 
Government direct taxes  25 
(5) 
Note: EU8: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, United Kingdom. 
EU11: EU8 + Italy, Netherlands, Sweden. OECD14: EU8 + Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland,  United  States.  OECDI8:  OECD14  + Iceland,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Sweden. The 
sample periods for Norway are 1969-91  and 1978-91.  For each country we calculated the mean 
over time of each fiscal component. For each group the mean of these means is displayed in the 
table and the standard error of the means is displayed in parentheses. Government transfers do not 
include interest payments, subsidies, and transfers to the rest of  the world. 
Table 3.3  The Cyclicality of Fiscal Components (correlation with GDP) 
EU8  EUll  OECD14  OECD  1  8 
1971-93  1980-93  197  1-93  1980-93 
Government consumption  .23 
(.20) 
Government transfers  -  .07 
~29) 
~27) 
Government subsidies  .06 
Government indirect taxes  .68 
Government direct taxes  .4 1 
(. 18) 
(. 14) 
Nore:  EU8: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, United Kingdom. 
EUlI: EU8 + Italy, Netherlands, Sweden. OECD14: EU8 + Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland,  United  States.  OECD18:  OECD14 + Iceland,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Sweden.  The 
sample periods for Norway are 1969-91  and 1978-91.  For each country, we calculated the correla- 
tion of the growth rate of  every fiscal component with the growth rate of GDP. The mean of  these 
correlations is displayed in the table and the standard error (across countries) of the correlations is 
displayed in parentheses. 
macroeconomic insurance role of these budget components has increased in 
recent years. 
Table 3.4 displays the fraction of shocks to GDP absorbed by various com- 
ponents  of  the general public budget. We  measure  the  fraction of  shocks 
smoothed via government consumption by  estimating the coefficient in the 71  Consumption Smoothing through Fiscal Policy 
Table 3.4  Smoothing by Fiscal Components (percent) 
EU8  EUll  OECD14  OECD  1  8 
197  1-93  1980-93  197  1-93  1980-93 
Government consumption  13 
Government transfers  19 
(2) 
Government subsidies  4 
(1) 
Government indirect taxes  -3 
(2) 
Government direct taxes  -  15 
(5) 
Note: EU8: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, United Kingdom. 
EU11: EU8 + Italy, Netherlands, Sweden. OECD14: EU8 + Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland,  United  States.  OECD18:  OECD14 + Iceland,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Sweden. The 
sample periods for Norway are  1969-91  and 1978-91.  Fraction of  shocks smoothed via fiscal 
components. Standard errors in parentheses. For example, smoothing through government con- 
sumption is measured by estimating the coefficient in the panel regression (with time-fixed effects) 
of A log DNI' -  A log(DN1' + government consumption') on A log GDP'. If DNI + government 
consumption  is less correlated with GDP cross-sectionally  than DNI, then the coefficient will 
he positive, reflecting the fraction of  shocks to DNI absorbed by  government consumption. The 
coefficient in the regression of A log DNI' -  A log(DN1' + government transfers') on A log GDP' 
measures the fraction of shocks smoothed via government transfers and similarly for government 
subsidies. The coefficient in the regression of A log DNI' -  A log(DNI' -  taxes') on A log GDP' 
measures the fraction of shocks smoothed via taxes (government direct or indirect taxes, according 
to the case). 
panel regression (with time-fixed effects) of Alog DNI' -  Alog(DNI' + gov- 
ernment consumption') on Alog GDP, that is, we measure the fraction of the 
cross-sectional variance of GDP absorbed by government consumption. If the 
cross-sectional correlation of  (DNI + government consumption) with GDP is 
lower than the cross-sectional correlation of  DNI with GDP, then the coeffi- 
cient in this regression should be positive, measuring the fraction of shocks to 
GDP absorbed by  government consumption. The coefficient in the regression 
of Alog DNI' -  Alog(DNP + government transfers') on Alog GDP measures 
the fraction of shocks smoothed via government transfers. Similarly for gov- 
ernment subsidies. The coefficient in the regression of Alog DNI' -  Alog(DNI' 
-  taxes') on Alog GDP measures the fraction of  shocks smoothed via taxes 
(government direct or indirect taxes, according to the case).I9 
The results in table 3.4 bear out the above conjecture regarding the con- 
sumption-smoothing role  of  government  transfers, which  are,  indeed, the 
central mechanism providing consumption smoothing, although substantial 
19. In relation to the decomposition displayed in table 3.1, the fraction of shocks smoothed by 
components of  the government budget are a  further decomposition  of  the fraction of  shocks 
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consumption  smoothing is also achieved through government consumption. 
Even though government consumption varies positively with GDP (table 3.3), 
it tends to vary less than proportionately with GDP, which reduces the correla- 
tion of C + G (total consumption) with GDP, thereby contributing to consump- 
tion smoothing. It is worth noting that although government transfers constitute 
a smaller fraction of GDP compared to government consumption (table 3.2), 
transfers provide more consumption smoothing since they are less correlated 
with GDP.*O 
Subsidies also smooth consumption, slightly more in EU countries than in 
the entire OECD group, and somewhat more in the later sample, as one might 
expect from table 3.2.  It is worth noting that a small and countercyclical com- 
ponent, such as subsidies, can smooth consumption significantly. Direct and 
indirect taxes dis-smooth consumption. That is, taxes vary less than propor- 
tionally with GDP. When income increases by  1 percent, taxes typically in- 
crease by less than 1 percent (some taxes, for example taxes on property, may 
not depend on income in the short run). The amount of  dis-smoothing from 
direct taxes is declining over time, reflecting that direct taxes have become 
closer to being proportional to income at the annual frequency. Interestingly, 
the amount of consumption smoothing provided by indirect taxes and subsidies 
taken together is close to zero. We may be picking up here cross-subsidization 
among different groups within countries (e.g., indirect energy taxes that help 
finance subsidies to farmers), while the overall consumption smoothing effect 
of these two fiscal components appears to be close to zero. 
An important consequence of the results in table 3.4 is that consumption 
smoothing via government deficits is achieved through government consump- 
tion, transfers, and subsidies, not through taxes. Barro’s (1979) tax-smoothing 
theory predicts that (if income shocks are transitory, which they may not be) 
optimal public finance requires that taxes be proportional to income (a constant 
average tax rate). In our metric, this implies that taxes should provide no con- 
sumption smoothing. Our finding that the smoothing is provided only by gov- 
ernment consumption, transfers,  and subsidies is, therefore, consistent with 
tax-smoothing  theory, although the slight dis-smoothing  of  shocks by  taxes 
may be an indication of institutional rigidities that result in an average tax rate 
that is not constant. 
Table 3.5 displays the amount of  smoothing contributed by  fiscal compo- 
nents over three-year horizons. The main finding is that government transfers 
provide more consumption smoothing over longer horizons and that direct 
taxes provide less dis-smoothing at the three-year horizon in the EU.*’ 
20. S~rensen  and Yosha (forthcoming), in their analysis of federal insurance mechanisms for 
U.S. states, use the ratio of  the fraction of output shocks smoothed by  a fiscal component to the 
size of that component as a crude measure of its effectiveness in providing income smoothing. 
21. S~rensen  and Yosha (forthcoming) find that Social Security benefits in the United States 
smooth about the same fraction of shocks at different frequencies, but that personal income taxes 
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Table 3.5  Smoothing by Fiscal Components (percent): Three-Year 
Differenced Data 
EU8  OECD  14 
197  1-93  1971-93 
Government consumption  12 
(3) 
Government transfers  26 
(3) 
Government subsidies  2 
(1) 
Government indirect taxes  -3 
(3) 
Government direct taxes  5 
(9) 
Note: EU8: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, United Kingdom. 
OECD14: EU8 + Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, United States. The sample pe- 
riod for Norway is 1969-91.  Fraction of shocks smoothed via fiscal components. Standard errors 
in parentheses. See the note to table 3.4. 
3.3.2  Positive versus Negative Shocks 
In tables 3.6 and 3.7 we examine whether fiscal components smooth shocks 
in  an  asymmetric fashion, for example, contributing more to consumption 
smoothing in bad times.22  For each level of smoothing, we estimate two p co- 
efficients, one for negative shocks and one for positive shocks. To  measure 
smoothing in good and bad times we estimate the panel regression 
(3) Alog DNI: - Alog(DN1:  +  Xi) 
=  V, +  PO: Alog GDP: + p*(1 - D:)AlogGDP: +  u:, 
where 0: = 1 if in year t the country i growth rate of GDP is above the average 
growth rate (across years) of country i’s GDP, and 0, = 0 in years when the 
GDP growth rate of  country i is below average. p estimates the fraction of 
shocks absorbed by  the generic component X in good times, and similarly for 
p*  in bad times. The variable X denotes government consumption, government 
transfers, government subsidies, indirect taxes, and direct taxes, respectively, 
where taxes are measured with a negative sign. 
For OECD countries (table 3.6) there is no visible asymmetry in consump- 
tion smoothing through fiscal components, but for EU countries (table 3.7) we 
see that transfers tend to contribute more to smoothing in recessions. It  is, 
therefore, plausible that the large government transfers in EU countries, driven 
perhaps by generous social insurance policies, play an important role in gener- 
ating large government deficits, since increases in transfers during recessions 
are not easily reversed during upturns. Our result is, of course, only suggestive, 
22. These regressions do not correct for autocorrelation. Table 3.6  Smoothing by Fiscal Components in OECD Countries (percent): 
Negative versus Positive Shocks 
Positive Shocks  Negative Shocks 
OECD  14  OECD18  OECD14  OECD I8 
1971-93  1980-93  1971-93  1980-93 
Government consumption  13 
(2) 
Government transfers  18 
(2) 
Government subsidies  3 
(1) 
Government indirect taxes  -2 
(2) 
Government direct taxes  -10 
(4) 
Note:  OECD14:  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
Greece, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. OECD18: OECD14 + Ice- 
land, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden. The sample periods for Norway are 1969-91  and 1978-91.  Frac- 
tion of  shocks smoothed via fiscal components.  Standard errors  in  parentheses. For example, 
smoothing through government consumption is  measured by  estimating the coefficients in  the 
panel regression (with time-fixed effects) of A log DNI' -  A log(DN1' + government consump- 
tion') on v, + p 0;  A log GDP; + p* (1 -  D;)  A log GDP; + u;,  where 0,  = 1  if in year t the 
country i growth rate of GDP is above the average GDP growth rate of  country i, and D; = 0 in 
years when the GDP growth rate of country i is below average. p estimates the fraction of shocks 
absorbed by government consumption in good times, and p* the fraction absorbed in bad times. 
Table 3.7  Smoothing by Fiscal Components in EU Countries (percent): 
Negative versus Positive Shocks 
Positive Shocks  Negative Shocks 
EU8  EUl1  EU8  EUll 
197  1-93  1980-93  1971-93  1980-93 
Government consumption  12 
(2) 
Government transfers  17 
(2) 
Government subsidies  3 
(2) 
Government indirect taxes  -1 
(3) 
Government direct taxes  -  10 
(7) 
Nore:  EU8: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, United Kingdom. 
EU11: EU8 + Italy, Netherlands, Sweden. Fraction of  shocks smoothed via fiscal components. 
Standard errors in parentheses. See the note to table 3.6. 75  Consumption Smoothing through Fiscal Policy 
and further research on this issue is necessary before drawing firm conclu- 
sion~.~~ 
3.3.3  Consumption Smoothing and the Deficit Level 
We  ask whether there is a relation between the level of  the deficit and the 
amount of  consumption smoothing achieved via  saving. Large government 
deficits may  render private  sector and government consumption smoothing 
more difficult since in countries with a large government deficit, cross-country 
borrowing is very expensive, perhaps due to a lower credit rating on interna- 
tional financial markets. 
In tables 3.8-3.10  we  examine whether there is a relation between large 
government deficitsz4  and  the amount of  consumption smoothing achieved 
through the government deficit and through private saving. We split the sample 
into two groups according to the average deficit level over the sample for each 
country, with the same number of countries in each  We run the panel 
regression (3) where the dummy variable is constructed such that D; = 1 for 
all the years in the sample if country i is in the high-deficit group; if not, 0;  = 
0, and the generic variable X is either the government deficit or the negative of 
private saving. The coefficients p and p* measure the fraction of  shocks to 
GDP smoothed for high- and low-deficit countries, respectively. 
There is no evidence that the level of the deficit affects the amount of con- 
sumption smoothing provided through the deficit or through private saving. 
For the EU countries during 1971-93  (table 3.8), the point estimates indicate 
that smoothing through the government deficit is higher for low-deficit coun- 
tries, but for the OECD group (table 3.9) there is more smoothing in high- 
deficit countries. The conflicting point estimates, as well as the high standard 
errors, give no evidence for a relation between the size of the average deficit 
and the amount of consumption smoothing obtained via the deficit. 
From both tables, it appears that the amount of smoothing through the gov- 
ernment deficit has increased during the 1980s, while smoothing through pn- 
vate saving has decreased during the same period. The overall amount of con- 
sumption smoothing does not show any systematic differences between the 
full sample and the  1980-93  sample. Over three-year horizons (table 3.10) 
only a small fraction of  income shocks are smoothed by  private saving (the 
point estimates are even negative for low-deficit countries) with all consump- 
tion smoothing being done by the government-confirming  similar results in 
Sorensen and Yosha 1998. 
23. See Gavin and Perotti 1997, which displays similar results. 
24. All the reported results are for general government deficits. The results are similar when 
25. In regressions where the number of countries is odd, we include one more country in the 
central government deficits are used. 
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Table 3.8  Consumption Smoothing (percent) through Government Budget 
Deficits and Private Saving: High versns Low Deficit (EU countries) 
EU8, 1971-93  EU 11,  1980-93 
High Deficit  Low Deficit  High Deficit  Low Deficit 
Government saving  16  34  35  34 
(8)  (9)  (9)  (8) 
Private saving  37  14  -3  8 
(9)  (9)  (10)  (9) 
(7)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Total saving  53  48  32  42 
Note: EU8: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany,  United Kingdom. 
EUII: EU8 + Italy, Netherlands, Sweden. Fraction of shocks smoothed. Standard errors in paren- 
theses. We run a panel regression analogous to that in table 3.6. If country i is in the high-deficit 
group, then 0;  = 1 for all the years in the sample; if not, then 0;  = 0. The coefficients p and p* 
measure the fraction of  shocks to GDP smoothed for high- and low-deficit countries, respectively. 
The coefficients for government saving and private saving and have been adjusted to add up to the 
corresponding coefficient for total saving. 
Table 3.9  Consumption Smoothing (percent) through Government Budget 
Deficits and Private Saving: High versus Low Deficit 
(OECD countries) 
OECD  14, 197  1-93  OECD17, 1980-93 
High Deficit  Low Deficit  High Deficit  Low Deficit 
Government saving  29  20  40  31 
(5)  (6)  (6)  (5) 
Private saving  28  14  12  6 
(6)  (6)  (6)  (6) 
Total saving  57  34  52  37 
(4)  (5)  (5)  (6) 
Note:  OECD14:  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. Relative to the OECD14 
sample of  table  3.6, Iceland  is included  and Norway  is dropped, due to  availability of  data. 
OECD17: OECD14 + Italy, Netherlands, Sweden. Fraction of shocks smoothed. Standard errors 
in parentheses. See note to table 3.8. 
3.3.4  Consumption Smoothing and Fiscal Institutions 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (chap. 9 in this volume) found that appropriate 
budget institutions play an important role in limiting budget deficits. Control- 
ling for various political economy variables that may affect the deficit level, 
they found that countries where the budgetary process is governed by explicit 
targets negotiated by coalition members and in countries where power regard- 
ing fiscal matters is delegated to a strong party or person (e.g., a strong finance 
minister), deficits are significantly lower. 
We  ask whether the institutions examined by Hallerberg and von  Hagen 
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Table 3.10  Consumption Smoothing (percent) through Government Budget 
Deficits and Private Saving: High versus Low Deficits, Three-Year 
Differenced Data, 1971-93 
EU8  OECD  14 
High Deficit  Low Deficit  High Deficit  Low Deficit 
~~~  ~ 
Government saving  34  53  36  32 
(14)  (10)  (11)  (7) 
Private saving  12  -5  10  -2 
(9)  (10)  (9)  (7) 
(15)  (7)  (7)  (6) 
Total saving  46  48  47  30 
Note: Samples are described in notes to tables 3.8 and 3.9. Fraction of shocks smoothed. Standard 
errors in parentheses. See the note to table 3.8. 
budget, or if the fiscal discipline that they provide comes at a cost in terms of 
less ability to smooth income shocks. Using their data, we split the sample into 
two groups (of unequal  size), with “targets or delegation” countries in one 
group and the rest of the countries in the other group, estimating the amount 
of smoothing via fiscal components in each group (using the method explained 
above). The interesting finding (table 3.11) is that countries in the “targets or 
delegation” group clearly achieve more consumption smoothing through gov- 
ernment consumption and government transfers,  suggesting that the institu- 
tions that facilitate fiscal discipline also facilitate consumption smoothing via 
the budget. 
Subsidies smooth consumption significantly more in countries outside the 
“targets or delegation” group.26  A potential explanation is that countries with- 
out strong institutional constraints on the budget process are less able to resist 
lobbying efforts by industrial and agricultural interests seeking subsidies in re- 
cessions. 
Another interesting finding is that the total amount of consumption smooth- 
ing via saving is very similar across the two groups; namely, there is more 
consumption smoothing by the private sector in countries that are not in the 
“targets or delegation” group, compensating for the lower amount of consump- 
tion smoothing via the budget. This suggests that there may be some sort of 
“Second Moment Ricardian Equivalence,” that is, more consumption smooth- 
ing through government budget deficits crowds out consumption smoothing by 
households  and  corporations.  This  conjecture  requires,  no  doubt,  further 
scr~tiny.~’ 
Finally, there seems to be more dis-smoothing through direct taxes in coun- 
26. Closer inspection of the data reveals that these countries allocate a larger fraction of GDP 
to subsidies and that subsidies in all these countries vary countercyclically with GDP. 
27. The crowding-out phenomenon may be due to the fact that high central-government bor- 
rowing makes it harder for the private and local government sectors to obtain credit. If true, this 
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Table 3.11  Smoothing by Fiscal Components (percent): The Role of the 
Budgetary Process, EU 1980-93 
Targets or 
Delegation 
No  Yes 
Government consumption  -2 
(4) 
Government transfers  10 
(4) 
Government subsidies  10 
(2) 
Government indirect taxes  -5 
(5) 
Government direct taxes  I 
(9) 
Total saving  40 
(8) 
Nore:  “No”:  Countries  without  fiscal targets  or  delegation  (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Sweden). 
“Yes”: Countries with fiscal targets or delegation (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom). Fraction of shocks smoothed via fiscal components. Standard er- 
rors in parentheses. We run a panel regression analogous to that in table 3.8. For “Yes” countries 
0;  = 1 for all the years in the sample, and for “No” countries 0;  = 0. The coefficients p and p* 
measure the fraction of shocks to GDP smoothed for each group, respectively. 
tries with “targets or delegation,” but this result is somewhat tentative, being 
marred by very large standard errors. 
3.4  Concluding Remarks 
Our results have the following implications for the Maastricht guidelines: 
Since governments provide a large fraction of consumption smoothing, the re- 
strictions on the government deficit should be relaxed to allow governments to 
run large deficits in recessions.  Since large average deficits do not make it 
easier for governments to smooth consumption, our results do not provide any 
arguments for relaxing  the restrictions  on  government average debt levels. 
Wise fiscal policy can combine the benefits from long-run fiscal discipline with 
the benefits from government consumption smoothing, and our results provide 
some evidence that proper fiscal institutions will allow countries to achieve 
this goal. 
Of course, there are substantial benefits to consumption smoothing via gov- 
ernment fiscal policy only because income insurance on international capital 
and labor markets, and through international transfers, is practically nonexis- 
tent. The optimal long-run solution is probably to encourage the development 
of private markets for intercountry risk sharing. An important step in this direc- 
tion is to allow institutional investors in EU countries, such as pension funds 79  Consumption Smoothing through Fiscal Policy 
and life insurance companies, to invest freely in other countries. Other steps 
that should contribute to international income smoothing are reductions of in- 
ternational banking transaction costs (to which a common currency may con- 
tribute) and harmonization of  bank regulations across countries. These mea- 
sures  should  increase the  cross-country mobility  of  savings  deposits and 
facilitate international diversification of  private, corporate, and institutional 
asset portfolios. As capital market integration approaches the degree of inte- 
gration of U.S. markets (see Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha  1996), the need 
for consumption smoothing through government fiscal policy will be substan- 
tially reduced. 
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